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Abstract   
We examine the relationships among religious governance, especially Islamic governance quality (IGQ), national 
governance quality (NGQ), and risk management and disclosure practices (RDPs), and consequently ascertain whether 
NGQ has a moderating influence on the IGQ-RDPs nexus. Using one of the largest datasets relating to Islamic banks 
from 10 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries from 2006 to 2013, our findings are three-fold. First, we 
find that RDPs are higher in banks with higher IGQ. Second, we find that RDPs are higher in banks from countries 
with higher NGQ. Finally, we find that NGQ has a moderating effect on the IGQ-RDPs nexus. Our findings are robust 
to alternative RDPs measures and estimation techniques. These results imply that the quality of disclosure depends on 
the nature of the macro-social level factors, such as religion that have remained largely unexplored in business and 
society research, and therefore have important implications for policy-makers. 
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Introduction  
In this article, we seek to make a number of new contributions to the extant literature by: (i) 
examining the extent to which national and religious governance, especially Islamic governance quality 
influences the level of risk disclosure in Islamic banks; and (ii) consequently, ascertain whether the link 
between Islamic governance quality (IGQ) and bank risk management and disclosure practices (RDPs) is 
moderated by national governance quality (NGQ)1.  
Meanwhile RDPs are a significant part of a bank’s long-term financial sustainability and annual 
reporting. They often include managerial clarifications and commentaries about a bank’s up-to-date state 
regarding uncertainty and future predictions (Ntim et al., 2013). In fact, regulators and stakeholders have 
been concerned with RDPs in recent years, especially following the 2007/2008 global banking crisis 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015). This notwithstanding, the role of macro-
social level factors, such as religion and national governance in driving business decisions and outcomes, 
such as RDPs in distinct religious, cultural and business contexts remains largely unexplored (Du et al., 
2014; Ullah et al., 2014). Specifically, prior studies investigating the relationships among IGQ, NGQ and 
RDPs are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, and to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no extant study examining how NGQ might probably affect the IGQ-RDPs nexus. A number of 
reasons have often been cited for the lack of empirical research exploring the effect of religion in particular 
in corporate decision-making and outcomes, including religion being inherently divisive, sensitive and 
inconsistent with the principles underlying business (Tracey, 2012). Nevertheless, another strand of 
research suggests that religion can be influential in business decisions and operations (Chan-Serafin et al., 
2013). In this case, previous research has, for example, linked religiosity-based management to the extent 
of social and environmental disclosures (e.g., Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Losoncz, 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013), risk-taking (Chircop et al., 2017), earnings 
management (Elghuweel et al., 2017) and financial reporting irregularities (McGuire et al., 2012). The 
current study, therefore, seeks to address this lacuna within the extant literature by examining the links 
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among IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs. In addition, we explore why and how NGQ may have a moderating influence 
on the IGQ-RDPs nexus within Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Islamic banks.  
RDPs have witnessed substantial developments and interests in recent years (Abdallah et al., 2015). 
In this case, the prior literature suggests that Islamic banks may commit to increased RDPs for two main 
theoretical reasons: (i) efficiency/instrumental; and (ii) legitimation/moral ones. First and from efficiency 
perspective of neo-institutional theory, institutional pressures often originating from coercive, mimetic and 
normative forces can compel corporations to commit to standards and regulations that can enhance internal 
processes, improve efficiency and thereby gain competitive advantages. In this case, engaging in 
transparent RDPs may improve economic performance by reducing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013; Safieddine, 2009). Similarly, 
committing to increased RDPs may send positive signals to prospective investors about management’s 
willingness to engage in prudent risk management practices, and thereby offer access to cheaper capital 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). Further, improved RDPs can enhance financial performance and 
improve economic efficiency by offering Islamic banks’ access to critical resources, such as Islamic bonds 
(‘Sukuk’) and contracts (Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Second, the legitimation/moral view of neo-institutional theory predicts that coercive, mimetic, 
and/or normative institutional forces can compel Islamic banks to conform to expected social behaviour. 
This is because conforming to such expected social behaviour can be a strategic approach towards 
enhancing Islamic banks’ legitimacy and justifying their right to exist (Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 
2013). Thus, compliance with good RDPs in the form of increased risk disclosures can facilitate congruence 
of the goals and norms of Islamic banks with those of the broader society, and thereby improve 
organisational legitimacy. Similarly, the need to maintain good relationships with various bank stakeholders 
(Aguilera et al., 2007), and hence improving organisational legitimacy, can serve as a motivation for Islamic 
banks to engage in or mimic accepted social behaviour (Al-Bassam et al., 2017). Hence, engagement in 
RDPs by Islamic banks can strategically enhance their legitimacy by helping to gain the support of powerful 
stakeholders, such as governments, employees, shareholders, depositors and investors (Freeman, 1984; 
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Freeman & Reed, 1983). Consequently and in consideration of the apparent complex nature of the 
relationship among RDPs,  Islamic governance and national governance in specific settings, such as MENA 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017), there have been increasing calls for research that can 
explore the determinants of RDPs from theoretical perspectives that have the capacity to capture both 
efficiency and legitimation motives underlying corporate engagement in RDPs (Judge et al., 2008, 2010; 
Ntim et al., 2013).  
Noticeably, the extant research has examined a wide range of motivations and antecedents of RDPs 
(e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Dobler et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). However, 
existing research seems to suffer from a number of weaknesses. Despite the significance of increased RDPs 
and the associated substantial accounting standards (e.g., International Financial Reporting Standards 7 and 
9, International Accounting Standards 32 and 39), and corporate governance reforms worldwide 
(Abdulrahman et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), existing RDPs research is largely 
focused on examining the influence of either firm-level characteristics (e.g., Dobler et al., 2011; Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006) or internal corporate governance mechanisms (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013) on 
RDPs in non-financial firms in developed countries. By contrast, studies investigating why and how religion 
and other macro-social level factors may influence the level of RDPs in Islamic banks are rare (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Ullah et al., 2014), especially in developing countries (Abdallah et al., 2015). Meanwhile 
a number of studies indicate that macro-social level institutional factors, such as national governance and 
religion can influence corporate decisions and outcomes (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 
2013). In the case of IGQ and NGQ, for example, it has been argued from a neo-institutional theoretical 
perspective that they can help in determining how bank executives treat their shareholders, as well as make 
decisions, including those relating to voluntary disclosures (Essen et al., 2013), and thus, can arguably 
ultimately affect RDPs directly. Also and despite the growing suggestions that NGQ may be an important 
driver of bank strategies, behaviour, and valuation (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; 
Essen et al., 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), the extant research relating to the impact of NGQ on disclosure 
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quality (e.g., RDPs) has received little attention (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Schiehll et al., 
2014).  
Further and notwithstanding the lack of evidence relating to the IGQ-RDPs nexus (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), to the best of our knowledge, there 
is no extant research that has examined whether NGQ can moderate the IGQ-RDPs relationship. Meanwhile 
Islamic banks in the MENA region provide a unique context for exploring RDPs. Islamic banks operate on 
the basis of Islamic religious business principles, values, and laws that are drawn from Shariah (Islamic 
law), and thus arguably offer an interesting context to assess the extent to which religion (IGQ) and other 
macro-social level factors, such as NGQ may drive RDPs. In particular, the distinctiveness of Islamic 
banking/finance forms can create unique challenges regarding disclosure and society. For example, it has 
been suggested that some specific Islamic banking/finance forms, such as “mudarabah” (profit-sharing), 
“murabaha” (cost plus), “musharakah” (joint-venture), “bai-muajjal” (deferred payment sale), “ijarah” 
(leasing), and “istisna” (processing and manufacturing contracts) may not only be more prune to 
conventional agency conflicts, such as adverse selection and moral hazard problems, but also can 
exacerbate non-traditional agency problems by increasing opportunities for managerial expropriation of 
bank assets (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Safieddine, 2009). Further, MENA countries 
have observably pursued economic, corporate governance, accounting standards and regulatory reforms 
(Amico, 2014). These reforms have in the main created an enabling economic and corporate environment 
within which Islamic banks can maintain successful operations. However and arguably, the relatively poor 
NGQ in a  majority of MENA countries may affect the trustworthiness of Islamic banks. 
Hence, this study seeks to make a number of new contributions to the extant literature by examining 
the relationship among IGQ, NGQ and RDPs within such a distinct environment. First and drawing insights 
from a neo-institutional perspective, we offer first time evidence on the impact of IGQ on Islamic banks’ 
RDPs. Recent studies suggest that Shariah boards play an important role in monitoring Islamic bank’s 
financial reporting quality (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Safieddine, 2009). We extend 
this nascent research by providing evidence that Islamic governance can serve as an additional governance 
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layer with capacity to closely monitor and scrutinise managerial decisions, including those relating to 
disclosures. We argue that by highlighting the monitoring, performance and value maximising roles of 
Islamic governance within Islamic banks, our finding may help inform the decisions of the various 
stakeholders of Islamic banks, such as employees, depositors, investors, government and regulators. 
Second, and to the best of our knowledge, our study offers first time evidence on the effect of NGQ on 
RDPs. This result may potentially help investors and regulators to better understand and/or evaluate the 
channels (e.g., the institutional and regulatory setting) through which macro-social level factors, such as 
religion and national governance affect disclosure quality, transparency, and accountability within Islamic 
banks. Finally, previous research indicates that the relation between governance quality and disclosure 
varies according to the type of business, disclosure and contexts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). We extend this literature by providing first time 
evidence that shows that NGQ has a moderating effect on the relationship between IGQ and RDPs. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework. 
The folllowing sections review the extant empirical literature and develops research hypotheses, outline the 
research design, and discuss the empirical results, whilst the final section presents concluding remarks, 
discusses implications and recommendations for future research. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The variations in RDPs could be explained through a generalised neo-institutional lense because a 
generally accepted theory that links RDPs and governance is still elusive (Christopher, 2010; Ntim et al., 
2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). Thus, we employ a generalised neo-institutional perspective as a direct 
response to the latest calls for innovative alternative theoretical approaches to the ubiquitous agency theory 
for studying the link between IGQ and RDPs (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Christopher, 2010; Dobler et al., 
2011). One reason is that no single theoretical frameowrk may be able to offer a complete understanding 
of how Islamic and national governance mechanisms may affect RDPs on their own. By contrast, insights 
from a generalised neo-institutional perspective may offer unique insights towards interpreting and 
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explaining RDPs within distinctive regulatory and institutional contexts, such as MENA. Also, a neo-
institutional perspective may facilitate the examination of the potential interactions among IGQ, NGQ and 
RDPs (Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012; Zona et al., 2015).  
Briefly, a generalised neo-institutional theory incorporates both efficiency/instrumental perspective 
and legitimation/moral view of Islamic banks operating in an institutional environment rather than 
examining the incidence of particular institutional isomorphisms directly (e.g., coercive, mimetic, and/or 
normative institutional pressures). In this case and on the one hand, efficiency/instrumental perspective of 
the generalised neo-institutional theory suggests that effective mechanisms relating to bank- and national-
level governance quality may lead to more transparent risk disclosures. Consequently, increased risk 
disclosure can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce the information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 2009). Efficiency/instrumental 
motive further suggests that economic actors principally tend to maximise their self-interests by competing 
for critical resources.  
On the other hand, sociology theorists consider institutions to be beyond just delivering economic 
efficiency, but also as social institutions with some symbolic value (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Hence, the 
sociological neo-institutionalism theorists suggest that individuals and firms not only compete for critical 
resources, but also endeavour to gain social acceptance (“organisational legitimacy”) (Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2008). In this respect, legitimation is driven by the different values and ethics of economic actors, which 
may direct an Islamic bank, for example, to adopt some practices with no instant or clear economic benefits 
(e.g., interest-free loans or “Qard Hassan”). 
Specifically, Scott (2001) theorised that neo-institutional framework contains three levels of analysis: 
social (country) institutions; governance arrangements; and firms as economic actors. Social (country) level 
institutions provide a formal and informal platforms that provide legitimate models and standards of 
acceptable social behaviour (Judge et al., 2008, 2010). In this case, social (country) level institutions may 
interact to shape, facilitate, and/or limit the diffusion and/or imposition of structures and actions at lower 
levels. Thus, it suggests that Islamic banks are more likely to seek to conform to societal norms and 
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expectations, and as such may engage in increased risk disclosures, as a way of conforming to such 
expectations (Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). These pressures tend to arise from Islamic 
banks’ external and internal forces, and may lead to institutionalisation and organisations’ isomorphic 
behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim et al., 2013). Hence, a key principal assumption within a 
generalised neo-institutional theory’s perspective is that the firms are not only seeking “legitimacy” and 
social acceptance, but they are also competing for critical resources (“efficiency”).  
A generalised neo-institutional theory has rarely been employed at the organisational level of analysis 
relating to Islamic governance–RDPs nexus, and this is principally relevant with respect to the rapid global 
growth of Islamic banking over the past decades. Debatably, there is opportunity to extend our 
understanding of the institutional antecedents and justifications of RDPs beyond Islamic banks. Hence, 
complying with Basel Accords and IFRS through increased RDPs can enhance the legitimacy of bank 
generally. Similarly, voluntarily engaging in RDPs can help Islamic banks to gain organisational legitimacy 
by fairly balancing the diverse and often conflicting demands of their different influential stakeholders, 
such as investors, shareholders, governments and depositors (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 1983). 
Further, increased commitment to RDPs can send a credible signal to current and prospective investors of 
the quality of a bank’s governance structures, and by extension its positive current and future prospects  
(Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). This can enhance economic efficiency by granting access to 
critical resources, such as cheaper capital.  
This study, therefore, seeks to enhance these neo-institutional motives by drawing insights from all 
of them together (i.e., efficiency and legitimacy perspectives) in examining and understanding the 
associations among Islamic governance, national governance, and bank risk disclosures. To add further 
theoretical nuance to our neo-institutional lense, we cogitate how NGQ and further effects, such as ethical 
and religious values of the MENA region (i.e., IGQ) may influence RDPs, as presented in Figure 1. 
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Related Literature and Research Hypotheses Development 
Most prior literature on RDPs focuses on firm-specific factors (e.g., Dobler et al., 2011; Helbok & 
Wagner, 2006). However, the focus has recently shifted from firm-specific factors to firm’s internal 
corporate governance mechanisms following unprecedented malfeasance and bank failures (Ntim et al., 
2013). Conversely, there is no consistent evidence on the relationsship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and disclosure quality in banks (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013). Moreover, the role 
of religion and other macro-social level factors in influencing RDPs has not been explored. Specifically, 
most prior RDPs studies rely on single governance level analytical approach, while often being inattentive 
to the potential influence of religion and national governance level factors (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). 
Consequently, this study seeks to examine the impact of IGQ on the level of RDPs. Additionally, this study 
investigates the effect of NGQ on the level of RDPs. Finally, it explores why and how NGQ may have a 
moderating influence on the IGQ-RDPs nexus in MENA Islamic banks.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Islamic Governance Quality and Risk Management and Disclosure Practices 
It can be argued that Islamic banks’ activities are likely to be consistent with the shareholders, 
stakeholders and society’ expectations because of their explicit incorporation of Islamic values and laws 
(Shariah) into their operations (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Elghuweel et al., 2017). These include the prohibition 
of interest charges (“riba” or “usury”) and Shariah supervisory boards in Islamic banks that are responsible 
for assessing whether Islamic banks’ transactions meet the requirements of Islamic law and values2. Thus, 
it can be conjectured that Islamic governance may play an important role in Islamic banks’ decision-
making, including those relating to RDPs. For example, prudential supervision and principles regarding 
Islamic governance may place a better emphasis on committing to more transparent disclosure practices for 
a number of theoretical considerations (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011). From an 
efficiency/instrumental perspective (Aguilera et al., 2007; Chen & Roberts, 2010), neo-institutional theory 
suggests that Islamic governance is likely to convey additional monitoring requirements to Islamic banks 
due to further rules, experience, and knowledge needed to be Shariah-compliant (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; 
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Elghuweel et al., 2017). In particular, Islamic governance rooted in Islamic religious values and principles 
may offer opportunities to engage in greater RDPs through certifying whether Islamic banks have complied 
with Shariah and related risks, and thus, mitigating the level of information asymmetry beween managers 
and Isamic banks’ stakeholders (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Safieddine, 2009). From legitimation/moral view of neo-institutional theory predicts that Islamic 
governance may offer incentives to engage in greater RDPs in order to enhance their legitimacy within the 
broader society (Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). Further, 
Islamic governance may offer incentives to engage in greater RDPs, especially practices linked to 
complying with Shariah and related risks due to coercive and societal pressures, arising from MENA 
Islamic banks’ external settings, as well as institutional pressures within the banks (Chandler & Hwang, 
2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
A number of current qualitative studies have explored the nature of Islamic governance and ethics in 
Islamic banks (Ullah et al., 2014). For example, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) examined the ethical identity 
of Islamic banks using annual reports data from 7 Islamic banks in four Gulf countries from 2002 to 2004. 
They found that Islamic banks disclose further information relating to Shariah supervisory boards as a way 
of creating ethically and socially responsible identity for Islamic banks. Ullah et al. (2014) have also 
reported similar findings for Shariah departments relating to socially responsible investments. Further, 
Safieddine (2009) explores corporate governance practices using a survey of 43 questions from 40 Islamic 
banks in 5 Gulf countries. The results of Safieddine indicate that Islamic banks have well-established 
Shariah supervisory boards, which operate as good proxies for Islamic governance based on an evaluation 
of their independence, structure, education, and power.  
Prior quantitative studies have also found a strong evidence supporting the view that the quality of 
Islamic governance has a positive impact on social responsibility disclosures within Islamic banks (Farook 
et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). For instance, using data from 47 Islamic 
banks in 14 countries, Farook et al. (2011) found that Islamic governance quality, including the presence 
of a Shariah supervisory board has a positive impact on the level of social responsibility disclosures. 
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Similarly, prior literature has examined the relationship between Islamic governance quality and disclosure 
quality. For instance, using data from 75 firms listed on the Saudi market from 2004 to 2010, AI-Bassam 
and Ntim (2017) find that Shari’ah supervisory board characteristics have a positive effect on the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Similarly and using a sample of 116 Omani firms from 2001 to 
2011, Elghuweel et al. (2017) report that IGQ has a negative effect on earnings management. Notably, to 
the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined the impact of IGQ on RDPs to date, and thus 
genuine opportunity to make a new contribution to the literature by examining this association. 
Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
H1: The level of IGQ is positively related to the level of RDPs. 
 
National Governance Quality and RDPs 
Effective national governance may place further emphasis on RDPs (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; 
Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011). Efficiency/instrumental perspective of neo-institutional theory 
suggests that banks in countries with improved national governance quality may provide additional 
monitoring level that can mitigate information asymmetries, and hence, serve as a motivation to engage in 
greater RDPs (Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). Similarly, the 
legitimation/moral view of neo-institutional theory suggests that NGQ may offer Islamic banks incentives 
to engage in greater RDPs in order to gain the legitimacy to exist and carry out their operations from the 
broader society (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). 
Also, NGQ may offer incentives to engage in greater RDPs due to coercive and societal pressures arising 
from banks’ external settings, such as government, professional, and regulatory bodies (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Finally, effective national governance may offer motivations and pressures to engage 
in greater RDPs in order to offer Islamic banks access to required resources, such as Sukuk (Alon & Dwyer, 
2014; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
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National governance structures are designed and employed to address agency problems (Aguilera, 
2005; La Porta et al., 2000). They consist of formal constraints (e.g., regulations and laws, economic and 
political regulations and procedures, and other clear restrictions on bank behaviour), and informal rules 
containing unwritten, but relatively important, social norms, conventions, codes of ethics and values 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011; Schiehll et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Thus, national governance structures 
can serve as motivation for economic actors to comply with laws and regulations. Prior research suggests 
that national governance structures can protect stockholders from being expropriated by the company’s 
managers, and safeguards minority shareholder rights (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; La Porta et al., 2000; Schiehll 
et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Hence, rigorous national governance structures tend to demand 
mandatory information disclosure and regulate market intermediaries, and thereby alleviating information 
asymmetries. Also, it places the board of directors and managers under larger pressure to implement its 
regulatory responsibility (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Collectively, rigorous national governance structures 
can serve as a valuable external governance instrument to protect shareholder and influence accountability 
and disclosure quality. Thus, banks’ incentive to offer higher RDPs tend to be higher in countries with 
strong national governance structures. 
The findings of previous empirical studies largely suggest that NGQ may be an important driver of 
bank strategies, behaviour, and valuation (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et 
al., 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of  NGQ on disclosure 
quality, including RDPs is almost non-existent. For instance, using 85 banks from 20 European countries, 
Barakat and Hussainey (2013) found that countries with stronger NGQ (i.e., the rule of law) are associated 
with an increase in the level of operational risk disclosures. On the other hand, using data from 71 nations, 
Alon and Dwyer (2014) found that countries with poor NGQ are more likely to adopt IFRS early in 
comparison with their counterparts with strong NGQ, with the aim of allowing them to gain access to 
critical resources, such as foreign direct investments. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has 
examined the impact of NGQ  on RDPs to-date, and therefore offers genuine opportunities to contribute to 
the extant literature by examining the effect of NGQ on RDPs. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
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H2: NGQ is positively related to the level of RDPs. 
 
IGQ and RDPs: The Moderating Effect of NGQ 
Inconsistent results about the sign and significance of the governance quality-RDPs nexus has 
triggered a number of studies to explore them further (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). On the one 
hand, a number of studies indicate that different methodological approaches can lead to inconsistent results 
(e.g., Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). For instance, endogeneity 
problems (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), time frame differences (e.g., Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013) and different risk disclosure measures (e.g., Ntim et al., 2013) can affect the 
research findings. On the other hand, others suggest that the mixed results relating to the governance-RDPs 
nexus can be addressed by concentrating on how probable theory-driven variables moderate such a 
relationship (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger 
& Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013).  
La Porta et al. (1997 and 2000) suggest that NGQ (e.g., legal rules and enforcement quality) might 
enhance investor protection, as well as the efficiency of governance structures (e.g., corporate governance 
mechanisms, external finance type, and more importantly disclosure quality). Hence, La Porta et al. (1997 
and 2000) suggest that NGQ may have a moderating role on the existing agency problems. Thus, Islamic 
banks might be motivated by coercive, mimetic and normative national pressures, particularly for those 
operating in strongly-governed countries to engage in increased RDPs with the purpose of signalling their 
good performance and bright future prospects to their current and future stakeholders, such as employees, 
investors and depositors.  
Empirically, Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) report that NGQ has a complementary or substitutive 
influence on the governance-disclosure nexus using a sample of 1,044 European companies. Specifically, 
Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) results suggest that NGQ can serve as an alternative to firm-level 
governance quality in terms of its impact on corporate disclosure quality. Hence, we assume that the IGQ-
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RDPs relationship may be highly sensitive to the institutional environment, as characterised by the extent 
of NGQ. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
H3: NGQ moderates the relationship between IGQ and RDPs. 
All the earlier hypothesised relations are shown in Figure 1. 
Research Design 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
Our sample is based on all listed Islamic and dual banks (ISBs) located in 10 countries in the Arab 
MENA region, namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
UAE. We generate our sample based on the Bankscope database as shown in Table 1, from 2006 to 2013, 
covering pre-, during-, and post-2007/2008 banking crisis period. In addition, the sample begins in 2006 
since Basel II came into effect from mid-2005, as well as the fact that data before 2006 relating to the vast 
majority of our sample being unavailable. This results in a final sample of 64 banks over 8 years from 2006 
to 2013. This generated a total of 425 bank-year observations for our empirical analyses. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We collected the data from three different sources. Firstly, we collected RDPs and governance 
variables from annual reports, which we obtained mainly from the Perfect Information database and the 
sampled Islamic banks’ websites, where avaialable. Secondly, financial data was obtained from the 
Bankscope database and the Islmaic banks’ annual reports. Finally, national macro-economic statistics and 
national governance quality (NGQ) data were obtained from the World Bank’s databases. 
Definition of Variables  
The study’s variables are categorised into four main types and Table 2 presents the full definitions 
of all the variables used in this study. 
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 First and to test H1 to H3, we employ RDPs scores, as the dependent variable, which seek to measure 
the level of RDPs.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We measured RDPs variable using risk management and disclosure practices index (RDPI) based on 
6 broad subsections and total of 96 individual items drawn from several sources. Particularly, the individual 
items were drawn from the: (i) Basel accords (I, II and III); (ii) international accounting standards (IAS 32 
and 39; IFRS 7 and 9); and (iii) other risk disclosure items that have been employed previously in closely 
related studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). Hence, the RDPI 
contains 96 items classified as follows: (a) bank financial RDPs, consisting of: (i) credit; (ii) liquidity; (iii) 
market; and (iv) capital RDPs; and (b) bank non-financial RDPs, consisting of: (i) operational; and (ii) 
strategic RDPs. The Appendix displays the definitions and scoring procedure of all 96 items included in 
the RDPI.  
We use RDPI measurement approach instead of other quantitative measures (e.g., word, sentence, 
paragraph, and page counts) because indices measurement approach employed has the ability to measure 
RDPs more precisely (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim, 2016). More specifically, RDPI measurement 
approach has the capacity to capture the comparative weights of different risk categories. In addition, 
alternative quantitative measures, such as word, sentence, paragraph and page counts, have been repeatedly 
criticised for the increased probability of capturing non-RDPs (Beattie et al., 2004; Ntim, 2016); and there 
is no broad agreement with respect to a set of predefined words or sentences that can fully reflect RDPs in 
annual reports. As a result of these limitations, we employ the index approach in coding our RDPs. 
However, the index measurement approach is also often criticised for being inherently subjective (Marston 
& Shrives, 1991). Therefore, to reduce subjectivity, we followed the following steps.  
First, two independent coders coded a sample of 10 annual reports independently and their results 
were compared. Evidently, no main variances occurred, with high agreement coefficient (0.83), which is 
higher than the acceptable level in the social science (reliability threshold ranges from 0.70 to 0.80) (Beattie 
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et al., 2004; Krippendorff, 2004; Marston & Shrives, 1991). Second and subsequently, a single coder (the 
main coder) completed the coding of the rest of the RDPI. Third, the main coder re-coded a sample of five 
annual reports randomly, and the results were compared with his previous original coding results. 
Apparently, no significant variances occurred, with high agreement coefficient (0.95). Finally, we use 
Cronbach’s alpha to assess the internal consistency of the RDPI. The Cronbach’s alpha was sufficiently 
high at 83.50%; noting that the cut-off level for Cronbach’s alpha is 70% (Elghuweel et al., 2017).  
Second, and to test the first hypothesis, our independent variable is the Islamic governance quality 
index (IGQ). It covers seven IGQ best practices, including broad areas of Islamic governance and business 
principles. The detailed items are contained in Table 2. The IGQ seeks to measure the extent to which 
Islamic banks voluntarily and clearly incorporate Islamic governance and business principles into their 
operations, and subsequently disclosed in their annual reports. We selected these provisions based on three 
creteria. First, we conducted extensive exploration of the previous research that explores governance from 
an Islamic viewpoint and sourced Islamic governance quality variables used in those studies (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009; AI-Bassam & Ntim., 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair., 
2013; Safieddine, 2009). Second, we sourced relevant Islamic governance provisions contained in the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standard on 
independence of Shariah supervisory board. Finally, we supplemented these with Islamic governance 
variables that  were identified in a preliminary exploration of a sample of the sampled banks’ annual reports. 
Third, because several studies suggest that NGQ can affect the quality of disclosure (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012), we collected data 
on NGQ. This study employed the “Worldwide Governance Indicators” developed by the World Bank to 
measure national governance quality (NGQ). Kaufmann et al. (2011) identified six dimensions of NGQ: (i) 
voice and accountability (VAQ); (ii) political stability (PSQ); (iii) government effectiveness (GEQ); (iv) 
regulatory quality (RQ); (v) the rule of law (ROL); and (vi) control of corruption (COC). Correlation matrix 
in Table 3 shows that there are high inter-correlations among the six NGQ dimensions, which are consistent 
with the findings of prior studies (Alon & Dwyer, 2014). Therefore, and following prior research (Dikova 
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& Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), we conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) to 
create a composite measure for the overall NGQ dimensions. Table 4 shows the PCA (eigenvectors) and 
diagnostics of NGQ dimensions. The overall KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin), which we use as a measure of 
sampling adequacy is 0.7029, which is higher than the recommended minimum PCA value of 0.50 (Tunyi 
& Ntim, 2016). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, we included a wide range of bank-level governance mechanisms, bank-level characteristics 
and country-level factors, as control variables. These include: (i) bank-level governance mechanisms, such 
as board size (BDSZ), board gender diversity (GNDI), and non-executive directors (NEDs); (ii) bank-level 
characteristics, such as bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency 
(CSTR), and capital adequacy ratio (CAPR); and (iii) country-level variables, such as annual inflation 
(INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). We do not develop direct theoretical links between these 
variables and RDPI for brevity, but the findings of a number of prior studies suggest that they can influence 
the level of the RDPI (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Helbok 
& Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). 
 
Model Specification 
We use fixed-effects regression analysis (Ntim et al., 2013) to investigate the moderating effect of 
NGQ on the relationship between IGQ and RDPs in MENA Islamic banks. Therefore, our main regression 
model to be considered is identified as follows: 
                             

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where, 
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RDPI is a proxy of risk management and disclosure practices level for bank i during year t. IGQ 
refers to Islamic governance quality (IGQ). NGQ refers to national governance quality. CONTROLS refers 
to: (i) bank-level governance mechanism, including board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), and non-
executive directors (NEDs); (ii) bank-level characteristics, namely bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), 
liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), and capital adequacy (CAPR); and (iii) country-level 
control variables including, annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). is the bank-
year specific fixed-effects, and  is the white noise error term.  
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and 
multivariate regression analyses in the following sections. 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the main indices (i.e., the un-weighted risk management 
and disclosure practices index - RDPI), the weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (W-
RDPI), and national governance quality (NGQ) for the full dataset, as well as for each of the 8 bank-years 
examined, respectively. On average, the distribution of the RDPI differs considerably, ranging from 1.04 
per cent (1 out of 96 items disclosed) to 87.50 per cent (84 out of 96) with a mean of 60.49 per cent. Also, 
Table 5 reports that the RDPI improved over-time. For instance, the mean of the RDPI improved steadily 
from 37.36 per cent in 2006 to 67.85 per cent in 2013. The steady improvement in the RDPI suggests that 
the implementation of the Basel Accords (Basel I, II and III), international accounting standards (IAS, 32, 
9, IFRS 7 and 9) and national CG codes (e.g., Egypt, Oman and Saudi CG codes) appear to have helped in 
improving the level of RDPs among MENA banks. This seems to reflect the importance that has been 
attached to RDPs and good national governance, particularly during, and after, the 2007/08 credit crunch 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, the distribution of the W-
RDPI depicts a similar pattern to the distributio of the RDPI. By contrast, the distribution of the NGQ 
fluctuates substantially, ranging from -8.19 to 3.22 with the mean of 0.48. Also, Table 5 reports that NGQ 
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has been fluctuating over time. Continuous fluctuations in NGQ reflect the nature of MENA context. In 
particular, MENA countries have experienced considerable political instability, especially in the form of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, as well as the impact of the 2007/08 credit crunch in the MENA region (Beltratti & Stulz, 
2012; Hasan & Dridi, 2010). 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 shows summary statistics for all variables. Similar to the RDPI, all the independent and 
control variables distributions generally show widespread variations. For instance, Islamic governance 
(ISQ) ranges from 0.00% to 100.00% with a mean of 35.43%. Also, board size (BDSZ) ranges from 3.00 to 
15.00 with a mean of 10 board members. These results are in line with previous related studies in the 
banking sector (e.g., Hasan & Dridi, 2010; Rosman et al., 2014). Finally, the values of other variables 
reported in Table 6 suggest widespread variations in our sample, and hence decreasing the possibilities of 
any sample selection bias. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 reports the correlation matrix of Pearson’s parametric coefficients for all variables to test for 
multicollinearities relating to the regression analysis. Evidently, low correlation coefficients among the 
variables presented in Table 7 indicate absence of any serious multicollinearity problems. In addition, Table 
7 shows statistically significant correlation between the RDPI and the other variables. For instance, BDSZ, 
NEDs, IGQ, NGQ, LTAS, and LIQR are positively related to the RDPI, whilst CAPR and INFR are 
negatively associated with the RDPI. 
Regression Analyses and Discussion 
Table 8 reports the fixed-effects regression results of the relationship among national governance 
quality (NGQ), Islamic governance quality (IGQ) and risk disclosures (RDPs). The findings of Models 1, 
2, and 3 indicate that IGQ and NGQ are important in explaining observable differences in RDPs as follows. 
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First, we examine whether IGQ affect the level of RDPI. The coefficients of the IGQ in Models 2 and 3 of 
Table 8 are positive (t = 8.35, p < 0.001 and t = 8.79, p < 0.001, respectively), and thus providing empirical 
support for H1. Specifically, this offers a new evidence which suggests that better-governed Islamic banks 
are more transparent about their risk management and disclosure practices than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of IGQ on the level 
of RDPs. This evidence is largely in line with previous studies that suggest that Islamic governance can 
improve general voluntary disclosure quality (e.g., Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2007). This evidence is also consistent with the expectations of our neo-institutional framework 
presented in Figure 1, which suggests that effective Islamic governance conveys additional monitoring and 
accountability requirements on Islamic banks, and thereby encouraging them to engage in greater RDPs 
(AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly, enhanced RDPs, 
due to coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures can lead to higher levels of risk disclosures in order to 
gain legitimacy from the broader society, which can facilitate access to critical resources, such as finance 
(Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Connelly et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Pittroff, 2014). All together, 
the result reveals that religiosity (i.e., Islamic governance) can serve as a motivating force for managers to 
commit to greater levels of accountability and transparency through increased RDPs, and thereby improve 
both the efficiency and legitimacy of Islamic banks’ operations (e.g., Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et 
al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, our results show that cross-sectional differences in the RDPI level can largely be explained 
by NGQ. Specifically, the coefficient of the NGQ in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 is positive (t = 2.84, p < 
0.005 and t = 6.46, p < 0.000, respectively), and thus providing empirical support for H2. In particular, this 
offers a new evidence to suggest that banks in better-governed countries engage in greater RDPs compared 
with their poorly-governed counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence 
to examine the impact of NGQ on RDPs, although this finding offers further empirical support for the 
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findings of prior studies that suggest that NGQ has a positive effect on general voluntary disclosures 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Cahan et al., 2015). This evidence is also consistent with the expectations of 
our neo-institutional theoretical perspective, which suggests that improved NGQ can provide additional 
layer of monitoring that can help mitigate the level of information asymmetry, and hence, offering bank 
executives greater motivation to commit to increased risk disclosures. Collectively, the NGQ results in 
Tables 8 and 9 are consistent with the notion that NGQ has a positive effect on bank executives’ 
commitment to accountability and transparency in the form of increased RDPs. 
Finally, to ascertain whether the IGQ-RDPI relationship can be moderated by NGQ (to test H3), we 
create interaction variables between the IGQ and NGQ variables (i.e., NGQ*IGQ) in Model 3 of Table 83. 
Our estimation is based on the emerging theoretical and empirical evidence (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera et 
al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013), 
which suggests that the impact of the IGQ on RDPs can be enhanced in countries with higher NGQ. 
Observably, the respective coefficient of NGQ*IGQ on the RDPI in Model 3 of Table 8 (t = 1.80, p < 0.072) 
is positive, and thus providing original evidence, which supports H3. That is, this contributes to the literature 
by offering a new evidence which suggests that the IGQ-RDPI relationship is significantly and positively 
improved by NGQ. Thus, this result offers further evidence of the influence that NGQ has on the IGQ-RDPI 
relationship. Specifically, our evidence indicates that Islamic bank managers operating in better-governed 
countries are more likely to coercive, mimetic and normative pressures from national institutions, such as 
accounting regulators, business and treasury ministries and stock exchanges. This appears to compel Islamic 
bank executives to commit to increased risk disclosures as a way of gaining legitimacy from the broader 
society, and thereby securing access to critical resources, such as finance.  
Additional Analyses 
We perform a number of further analyses to determine the robustness of our results. First, as a 
robustness check, we reproduce our analysis in Model 3 of Table 8 by replacing our unweighted RDPI with 
the weighted RDPI (W-RDPI), and the results are presented in Model 6 of Table 8. These results are similar 
to those reported in Model 3 of Table 8, implying that our results seem to be robust to the use of a weighted 
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or an un-weighted disclosure index. Secondly, following extant research (e.g., Ntim et al., 2013), we 
address potential endogeneities that may be affected by omitted variable bias by estimating two-stage least 
squares using generalised panel-data estimators (G2SLS). First, we predict instruments by estimating a 
model for IGQ.  Second, we check correlations with error terms and then we use the predicted values as 
instruments. Thus, in the second stage, we use the instrumented variables of the IGQ and re-run equation 
(1) as follows:  
                               
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where, 
Everything else remains unaffected as stated in equation (1) except that we use the instrumented part 
of the IGQ, and other bank-level governance variabels. The results are presented in Model 4 of Table 8. 
These results are also similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 8, implying that our results appear to 
be robust to potential endogeneities that may be caused by omitted variables bias. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
Third, to ascertain the assumption underlying our fixed-panel regression model that all the 
unobserved heterogeneities may affect the correlation between the Islamic governance variables and the 
error term is invariable over time, we calculate a dynamic panel GMM estimator as proposed by Wintoki 
et al. (2012). Dynamic GMM estimators have the unique ability to control for a number of endogeneity 
problems, including reverse causality, unobservable firm-specific factors, dynamic endogenous regressors, 
possible omitted variables bias, heteroscedasticity, and simultaneity by allowing all the explanatory 
variables (e.g., the Islamic governance and all control variables) to be considered as endogenous (Ammann 
et al., 2011; Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Wintoki et al., 2012). Consequently, in the 
dynamic GMM Model, we employ equation (3) as follows:  
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                                        𝑅𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝑘1𝑅𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (3) 
where, 
RDPI is a proxy of risk management and disclosure practices level for bank i during year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  
denotes all explanatory variables that include Islamic governance (IGQ), board size (BDSZ), gender 
diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (NEDs), and national governance quality (NGQ). 𝑍𝑖𝑡 includes 
bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), capital adequacy 
(CAPR), annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved bank-year 
specific fixed-effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the white noise error term. The results are presented in Model 5 of Table 
8. Again, we find the GMM results indicate a positive and statistically significant relation among the IGQ, 
NGQ and RDPs indices. These results are also largely similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 8, and 
thereby implying that our results appear to be robust to potential endogeneity problems that may be caused 
by reverse causality, unobservable firm-specific factors, dynamic endogenous regressors, possible omitted 
variables bias, heteroscedasticity, and simultaneity. 
Fourth, we consider the robustness of our results to sub-samples: Islamic banks and dual banks by 
re-running equations (1), (2), and (3) and the results are reported in Table 9. Apart from a few sensitivities 
(such as GNDI being now statistically significant), the results in Table 9 are similar to those reported in 
Table 8, and thereby implying that our results seem to be fairly robust to the use of sub-samples. Finally, 
Table 10 reports the results of the variables that influence banks to commit to greater risk disclosures, and 
how those variables work among banks operating in strongly-governed and poorly-governed environments. 
Table 10  reveals that IGQ and NGQ have a significant impact on RDPs in banks that operate in strongly-
governed environments compared with their counterparts that operate in countries with poorly-governed 
national environments. Similarly, we found that gender diversity has a positive effect on RDPs in banks 
that operate in strongly-governed environments compared to their counterparts operating in poorly-
governed countries, although this relationship is not statistically significant. Overall, the results support our 
hypothesis that NGQ has a moderating effect on the relationship between IGQ and bank risk disclosures.  
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Conclusion and Areas for Future Research 
Whilst the effects of business level factors on the level of corproate risk management and disclosure 
practices (RDPs) have been fairly documented, the role of religion and macro-social level factors, such as 
Islamic and national governance quality on RDPs are rare. Therefore, this article has sought to make a 
number of new contributions to the extant literature by examining: (i) the associations among religious 
governance, especially Islamic governance quality (IGQ), national governance quality (NGQ), and RDPs; 
and (ii) consequently, ascertaining whether the link between IGQ and RDPs can be moderated by NGQ.   
Using one of the largest datasets to-date from MENA Islamic banks over the 2006-2013 period, our 
study reveals several interesting findings. Our results suggest that Islamic and national governance quality 
has a significant effect on the level of bank risk disclosures. Specifically, our results indicate that risk 
disclosures are high in banks with high IGQ and NGQ. In addition, our results indicate that NGQ moderates 
the association between IGQ and RDPs. This implies that banks that depict greater commitment towards 
incorporating Islamic governance into their operations through high Islamic governance index score and 
located in better-governed countries engage in higher risk disclosures than those that are not. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of our neo-institutional framework that incorporates both 
efficiency/instrumental and legitimation/moral views of neo-institutional theory.  
This study makes a number of new contributions to the extant literature. First, and to the best of our 
knowledge, our study offers a first-time evidence on the effect of national governance quality on bank risk 
management and disclosure practices using a neo-institutional framework. Second, we offer evidence on 
the impact of Islamic governance quality on bank risk management and disclosure practices. Finally, we 
provide evidence relating to the moderating effect of national governance quality on the relationship 
between Islamic governance quality and bank risk management and disclosure practices for the first time. 
The success of our generalised neo-institutional framework in explaining the variations and drivers of bank 
risk disclosures reflects in part its ability to integrate complexity. The diverse variations of institutionalism 
within our research context make it doable to cogitate the contextual embeddedness of the intersections 
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between religion and country governance, as macro-social level forces operating within the context of 
Islamic banks. 
Consequently, our results have a number of implications for regulators, banks, and investors, 
especially in emerging markets. Our results suggest that better-governed banks at bank- or national-level 
have higher tendency to commit to increased level of risk disclosures. These results offer regulators extra 
incentive to pursue internal CG reforms jointly with national-level governance reforms. Regarding banks, 
our results suggest that better Islamic governance is expected to be associated with better risk disclosures. 
These results offer shareholders of banks additional incentive to enhance their banks’ board structure (e.g., 
board size and board independence) and pay attention to Islamic governance arrangements in particular. 
These results also bring to bear the importance of Islamic governance in mitigating traditional agency 
problems, such as information asymmetry, and thereby enhancing bank efficiency and legitimacy within 
the broader society. Thus, our study also has practical implications. Specifically, banks that voluntarily 
incorporate prudential Islamic governance into their operations are more likely to be more transparent about 
their RDPs and, hence, offers new crucial insights on Islamic governance and their impact on disclosure 
quality. Overall, our results highlight the role that religion and national governance, as major macro-social 
forces, can play in traditional rational business decision-making, such as disclosure and transparency. 
Finally, although our evidence is significant and robust, there are a number of limitations that need 
to be explicitly acknowledged. Like all archival and quantitative studies of this nature, our governance and 
disclosure proxies may or may not reflect actual managerial practice. In this case, additional insights may 
be offered by future studies that may employ qualitative approaches using, for example, interviews, case 
studies and observations that may offer a more nuanced and indepth insights regarding these relationships. 
Further researchers might investigate the impact of further governance mechanisms (e.g., risk committee 
and remuneration committee) on risk disclosures; and might also be extended to the use of non-parametric 
statistical techniques, such as neural networks to test the robustness of their findings. 
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Notes 
1. To facilitate early reader understanding, we clarify the three main concepts (variables) that we employ in this 
study as follows: Islamic governance quality (IGQ) refers to the extent to which bank executives are willing 
to voluntarily incorporate Islamic values and practices into the running of their banks. We measure this by 
IGQ disclosure quality index that contains items relating to the presence of Islamic governance structures, 
such as the presence of a Shariah supervisory board for a bank. Bank risk management and disclosure 
practices (RDPs) is a disclosure quality index that measures the extent and quality of voluntary bank risk 
disclosures, consisting of financial, operational and strategic risks with the individual risk items drawn from 
the Basel accords (I, II and III), international financial reporting standards (IAS 32 and 39; IFRS 7 and 9) 
and prior studies. Finally, national governance quality (NGQ) refers to the World Bank’s world governance 
indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) and consist of six measures: (i) voice and accountability 
quality; (ii) political stability quality; (iii) government quality; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law quality; 
and (vi) control of corruption quality. 
2. Islamic values consist of positive values, such as accountability, equality, ethics, fairness, honesty, integrity, 
philanthropy, responsibility and transparency that are encouraged in sharp contrast to negative values, such 
as gambling, profiteering and exploitation that are strictly prohibited (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Sarker, 
2012; Syed & Van Buren, 2014). 
3. As a robustness check, we also employ Hierarchical regression procedure that examines whether IGQ-RDPI 
relationship can be moderated by NGQ. The (untabulated) results indicate that NGQ are both relevant and 
significantly moderate IGQ-RDPI relationship. This offers further empirical support to our main conclusions 
drawn from Tables 8, 9 and 10. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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Appendix  
Risk type Risk management and disclosure practice index (RDPI) 
 Financial risk management and disclosure practices 
(i) Credit  1- Exposure to credit risk and how they arise. 
2-  Objectives, policies and processes for managing credit risk. 
3-  Method of measuring credit risk exposure. 
4-  Adequately description of how credit risk management occurs, including providing a clear linkage 
between quantitative data and qualitative description. 
5-  Changes in exposure to credit risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to 
manage credit risk from the previous period. 
6-  Amount of regulatory capital for credit risk.  
7-  Information about credit quality of financial assets that are not past due or impaired. 
8-  Renegotiated financial assets. 
9-  Aging schedule for past due amounts. 
10- Impairment methods and inputs disclosed. 
11- Summary quantitative data about exposure to credit risk at the reporting date. 
12- Maximum credit exposure by currency. 
13- Maximum credit exposure by geography. 
14- Maximum credit exposure by economic activity. 
15- Disaggregated maximum credit risk exposure, including derivatives and off-balance sheet items. 
16- Renegotiated loans for troubled borrowers. 
17- Risk of counterparty. 
18- Credit risk concentrations. 
19- Derivatives. 
20- Off-balance sheet and joint venture structures. 
21- Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.   
22- Collateral. 
23- Disclosures to help users understand credit risk. 
(ii) Liquidity 24- Exposure to liquidity risk and how they arise. 
25- Objectives, policies and processes for managing liquidity risk. 
26- Methods used to measure liquidity risk. 
27- Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to 
manage liquidity risk from the previous period. 
28- Contractual undiscounted cash flows. 
29- Maturity analysis of non-derivative liabilities. 
30- Maturity analysis of derivative liabilities. 
31- Maturity analysis of off-balance sheet commitments and other financial instruments without 
contractually stipulated maturity. 
32- Maturity analysis of financial assets. 
33- Expected maturity analysis. 
34- Derivative and trading liabilities treatment.  
35- Liquidity risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.  
36- Liquidity buffers sources and volume. 
37- Sensitivity analysis. 
38- Financing facilities. 
39- Counterparty concentration profile. 
40- Disclosures to help users understand liquidity risk. 
(iii) Market 41- Objectives, policies, processes, and Strategies of market risk management.  
42- Structure and organization of market risk management function. 
43- Instruments traded types. 
44- Interest rate risk. 
45- Equity risk. 
46- Currency risk. 
47- Commodities risk 
48- Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.   
49- Linkage with credit risk. 
50- Amount of regulatory capital for market risk.  
51- VAR (value-at-risk). 
52- VAR limitations. 
53- Stress testing. 
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Risk type Risk management and disclosure practice index (RDPI) 
54- Stress VAR. 
55- Back-testing. 
56- Disclosures to help users understand market risk. 
(iv) capital 57- Capital management. 
58- Capital measurement. 
59- Risk weighted assets. 
60- Tier 1. 
61- Tier 2. 
 Non-financial risk management and disclosures practices 
(v) Operational 62- Amount of regulatory capital for operational risk.  
63- Regulatory capital for operational risk measurement approach.  
64- Operational risk management strategies and processes. 
65- The operational risk management function structure and organisation. 
66- Scope and nature of the operational risk reporting system 
67- Operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.  
68- Operational value-at-risk. 
69- Internal audit function/internal control system. 
70- Key risk indicators/early warning systems. 
71- Self-assessment techniques. 
72- Stress tests/scorecard models/scenario analyses. 
73- Operational risk event databases.  
74- Legal risks.  
75- Additional information on risk exposure and management.  
76- Technology/information technology. 
77- Compliance. 
78- Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott. 
79- Competition/proprietary/copyright. 
80- Personnel. 
81- Integrity/management and employee fraud.  
82- Business ethics/corruption.  
83- Disclosures to help users understand operational risk. 
(vi) Strategic 84- Sovereign/politics. 
85- Performance measurement. 
86- Regulation. 
87- Taxation. 
88- Macroeconomic trends. 
89- Natural disasters/terrorism. 
90- GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand. 
91- Intellectual property rights. 
92- New alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions. 
93- Management of growth. 
94- Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name.  
95- Strategy. 
96- Disclosures to help users understand strategic risk. 
Total  96 Risk management and disclosure practices items 
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index 
0:        Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1:        Risk item disclosed by bank. 
Procedure of scoring for weighted index 
0:        Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1:        Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information. 
2:        Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Proposed empirical model 
Notes: The graph describes the structural relations between Islamic governance (IGQ), national governance quality 
(NGQ), and risk management and disclosure practices (RDPs), either directly (solid lines) or via moderating effect of 
national governance quality (NGQ) (dotted lines). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample selection procedure 
 Banks             Number of bank-year observations Percentage 
Country  Islamic  Dual  Overall   
Bahrain   9 44 24 68 14.56% 
Egypt   6 13 20 33   8.01% 
Jordan   3   3 13 16   3.88% 
Kuwait   6 36   5 41   9.95% 
Lebanon   2   0 16 16   3.88% 
Oman   4   0   5   5   1.21% 
Qatar   8 24 28 52 12.62% 
Saudi Arabia 11 21 63 84 20.39% 
Syria   1   6   0   6   0.24% 
UAE 14 32 72 104 25.24% 
Sum 64 179 246 425 100.00% 
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Table 2: Summary of definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions and coding. 
Panel A: Dependent variable (risk management and disclosure practices index). 
RDPI  The total risk management and disclosure practices score (RDPI) is calculated based on the un-
weighted (weighted) risk management and disclosure practices index and full scoring criteria are 
clarified in the Appendix. Un-weighted RDPI consisting of 96 items drawn from three major 
sources: (i) the Basel accords (I, II and III), international accounting standards (IAS 32 and 39; 
IFRS 7 and 9); and (iii) past risk disclosure studies, covering three main types of risk: (i) financial 
risk disclosures; (ii) operational risk disclosures (non-financial risk) and strategic risk disclosures 
(non-financial risk). It takes a value of 1 if each of the 96 RDPI items is disclosed, 0 otherwise; 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.  
For the weighted RDPI, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 if risk item is 
not disclosed; 1 if a risk item focuses on past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information; and 
2 if a risk item focuses on past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information). This 
weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of 192; scaled to a value between 
0% and 100%. 
Panel B: Islamic governance quality index 
IGQ  The Islamic governance quality (IGQ) index consists of 7 items with each taking a value of 1 if 
disclosed, otherwise 0 as follows; (i) 1 if a Shariah supervisory board (SSB) exists, 0 otherwise; (ii) 
1 if SSB report is disclosed, 0 otherwise; (iii) 1 if the SSB’s members are disclosed, 0 otherwise; 
(iv) 1 if SSB’s number of annual meetings are disclosed, 0 otherwise; (v) 1 if a statement that the 
SSB’s members are independent from management is disclosed, 0 otherwise; (vi) 1 if the experience 
of the a bank’s SSB’s members is disclosed, 0 otherwise; and (vii) 1 if the total fees or remuneration 
paid to the members of a bank’s SSB is disclosed, 0 otherwise. This un-weighted scoring procedure 
can result in a total potential score of 7; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
Panel C: National governance quality (NGQ) 
NGQ National governance quality (NGQ) for each bank year is calculated as a composite measure for the 
overall NGQ 6 dimensions, which: (i) are voice and accountability quality (VAQ); (ii) political 
stability quality (PSQ); (iii) government quality (GEQ); (iv) regulatory quality (RQ); (v) rule of law 
quality (ROL); and (vi) control of corruption quality (COC).  
Panel D: Control variables 
BDSZ Board size for each bank year is calculated based on number of board of directors. 
GNDI Board gender diversity for each bank year is calculated based on number of female directors divided 
by the total number of board of directors. 
NEDs Board independence for each bank year is calculated based on the non-executive directors divided 
by the total number of board of directors. 
LTAS Bank size for each bank year is calculated based on natural log of the book value of total assets. 
ROA Performance for each bank year is calculated based on return on assets (ROA), which is net income 
divided by total assets. 
LIQR Liquidity for each bank year is calculated based on net loans divided by total assets.  
CSTR Operations efficiency for each bank year is calculated based on cost divided by income. 
CAPR Bank’s capital adequacy for each bank year is calculated based on capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets. 
INFR Annual inflation for each bank year is consumer price change (annual %). 
GDP GDP per capita for each bank year is average income per individual (current US$). 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of the national governance quality’s six dimensions 
Variable VAQ PSQ GEQ RQ ROL COC 
VAQ       
PSQ 0.3005      
GEQ 0.2839 0.7928     
RQ 0.2423 0.6025 0.862    
ROL 0.2161 0.8197 0.7615 0.7902   
COC 0.2899 0.8731 0.9379 0.7849 0.8349 1.00 
Notes: National governance quality (NGQ) variables are as follows: Voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability 
quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law quality (ROL), and control of corruption quality 
(COC). See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable. 
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Table 4: PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of the national governance quality’s six dimensions 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained KMO 
VAQ 0.176 0.979 0.060 0.075 -0.035 -0.019 0 0.8226 
PSQ 0.428 -0.008 -0.659 -0.054 0.599 0.148 0 0.7523 
GEQ 0.455 -0.067 0.203 -0.530 0.018 -0.683 0 0.6687 
RQ 0.419 -0.111 0.699 0.178 0.393 0.369 0 0.6309 
ROL 0.435 -0.145 -0.130 0.755 -0.307 -0.329 0 0.6658 
COC 0.463 -0.063 -0.125 -0.329 -0.626 0.517 0 0.7950 
Eigenvalue 4.336 0.900 0.416 0.250 0.070 0.028            - - 
Proportion 0.723 0.150 0.069 0.042 0.012 0.005 - - 
KMO - - - - - - - 0.7029 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQ) PCA (eigenvectors). Comp refers to 
component. The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQ) are defined as follows: Voice and accountability 
quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law quality (ROL), 
control of corruption quality (COC). Also Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) is a measure of sampling adequacy. See Table 2 
for the definitions of each variable. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics for RDPI, W-RDPI, and NGQ 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (RDPI) (%)  
Mean 60.49 37.36 51.84 58.20 61.97 64.85 64.74 66.35 67.85 
Min 1.04 6.25 7.29 1.04 7.29 34.38 30.21 36.46 37.50 
Max 87.50 80.21 76.04 80.21 80.21 80.21 80.21 80.21 87.50 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (W-RDPI) (%)  
Mean 43.27 23.42 36.45 41.89 44.38 46.85 47.03 48.12 49.13 
Min 1.04 3.65 3.65 1.04 3.65 23.44 23.44 26.04 31.77 
Max 70.31 55.21 55.21 56.77 60.42 60.42 60.42 60.42 70.31 
Panel C: Independent variable: National governance quality (NGQ)  
Mean 0.48 -0.13 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.09 -0.27 -0.14 -0.05 
Min -8.19 -3.71 -4.00 -4.80 -4.55 -4.66 -5.44 -7.59 -8.19 
Max 3.22 1.69 1.82 2.16 3.22 2.83 2.14 2.99 3.05 
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information 
Database, Banks’ Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. The final 
number of bank-year observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for Dual banks. 
This table present summary of descriptive statistics of compliance levels with un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices 
index (RDPI) and weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (W-RDPI), in addition to national governance quality 
(NGQ) in the full sample and each year separately from 2006 to 2013. See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of all variables for all 425 observations 
Variables         N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
RDPI (%) 425.00 60.49 15.43 1.04 87.50 
W-RDPI (%) 425.00 43.27 11.92 1.04 70.31 
Independent variables 
IGQ (%) 425.00 35.43 26.71 0.00 100.00 
NGQ 425.00 0.48 2.08 -8.19 3.22 
Bank-level control variables 
BDSZ 425.00 10.17 2.01 3.00 15.00 
GNDI (%) 425.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.23 
NEDs (%) 425.00 0.88 0.19 0.00 1.00 
LTAS 425.00 16.03 1.58 3.73 21.09 
ROA (%) 425.00 0.01 0.05 -0.52 0.24 
LIQR (%) 425.00 53.42 15.74 0.00 79.93 
CSTR (%) 425.00 41.04 38.29 11.91 284.00 
CAPR (%) 425.00 21.18 16.83 9.26 204.41 
Country-level control variables 
INFR 425.00 4.70 4.12 -5.00 15.00 
GDPC 425.00 28068.99 24723.56 1472.60 93714.10 
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information 
Database, Banks’ Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. The 
final number of bank-year observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for 
Dual banks. This table reports the mean, standard deviation, and values of the minimum and the maximum range for all variables. 
See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable. 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix for variables used for all 425 observations 
Variable RDPI  BDSZ GNDI NEDs IGQ NGQ LTAS ROA LIQR CSTR CAPR INFR GDPC 
RDPI               
BDSZ  0.475**             
GNDI -0.025  0.117*            
NEDs  0.251**  0.036  0.007           
IGQ  0.332**  0.127**  0.161**  0.214**          
NGQ  0.282** -0.093  0.003  0.205** -0.065         
LTAS  0.564**  0.323** -0.195**  0.061  0.100*  0.091        
ROA -0.053 -0.054 -0.139**  0.024 -0.168**  0.159**  0.124*       
LIQR  0.292**  0.022 -0.160**  0.328** -0.073  0.372**  0.280**  0.278**      
CSTR -0.069 -0.009  0.330** -0.008  0.181** -0.222** -0.286** -0.541** -0.293**     
CAPR -0.116* -0.197** -0.162**  0.092 -0.009  0.051 -0.074  0.148**  0.020 -0.027    
INFR -0.316** -0.043  0.010 -0.269** -0.168** -0.434** -0.174** -0.011 -0.173**  0.038 -0.303**   
GDPC  0.053 -0.121* -0.099*  0.105*  0.073  0.244**  0.126**  0.274**  0.301** -0.222** -0.043  0.085  
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 
to 2013 inclusive. The final number of bank-year observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for Dual banks. This table reports 
the Pearson correlation coefficients. See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable. 
∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. 
∗   Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: National governance quality, Islamic governance quality, and risk management and disclosures 
practices 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RDPI) 
(1) RDPI  (2) RDPI  (3) RDPI  (4) G2SLS (5) GMM (6)W-RDPI  (7)W-G2SLS (8) W-GMM 
 Panel A: Independent variables  
Lagged RDPI      17.49***    
Lagged W-RDPI         23.01*** 
IGQ   8.35***  8.79***  10.08***  10.07***  7.09***  8.70***  3.17*** 
NGQ   2.84***  6.46***  5.73***  2.84***  4.95***  4.28***  1.09*** 
NGQ* IGQ    1.80*  1.71*  4.08***  0.62  0.70  1.73*** 
Panel B: Control variables 
BDSZ  12.09*** 14.06***  13.47***  3.21***  13.13***  11.88***  3.03*** 
GNDI  -1.60 -0.86 -1.37 -3.69*** -0.96 -1.55 -4.00*** 
NEDs   5.30***  4.78***  4.23***  4.83***  4.39***  3.47***  3.80*** 
NGQ* BDSZ    8.63***  7.80***  5.56***  8.10***  6.93***  2.47*** 
NGQ*GNDI    3.55***  3.21***  4.24***  3.41***  2.98***  1.96*** 
NGQ* NEDs    0.080  0.15  0.94  1.37  1.10  1.53*** 
LTAS  6.07***  3.93***  3.86***  5.48***  3.02***  4.33***  5.65***  0.30*** 
ROA -1.52 -0.44 -0.23 -0.75  0.46 -0.58 -1.14 -0.44*** 
LIQR  4.99***  4.26***  4.95***  5.08***  4.31***  5.01***  4.83***  1.33*** 
CSTR  1.20  0.85  0.64  0.86 -1.35  0.79  1.05 -2.27*** 
CAPR -2.07**  0.73  0.84  0.62  2.25**  1.03  0.91  1.89*** 
INFR -3.51*** -2.08** -1.77* -2.57** -0.78 -0.60 -1.88 -1.43*** 
GDPC -2.13** -0.57 -0.96 -0.54 -1.29 -1.81* -0.87  2.67*** 
Constant -0.65 -6.14*** -6.58*** -6.20*** -0.95 -7.71*** -6.68***  2.70*** 
Fixed effect  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year 
Clustering  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
F- value (χ 2)  23.02***  59.74*** 60.02*** 903.61*** 2074.33***  50.06***  712.86*** 508.36*** 
Overall R2  0.3284  0.5395  0.5628  0.5941   0.4903  0.5329  
No of obs  425  425  425  425 361  425  425 361 
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ 
Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. The final number of bank-year 
observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for Dual banks. This table reports the 
following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure practices (W-
RDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (NEDs), Islamic governance (IGQ), national governance quality 
(NGQ), bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), capital adequacy (CAPR), annual inflation 
(INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). See Table 3 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9: National governance quality, Islamic governance quality, and risk management and disclosures 
practices: Islamic vs. dual banks 
Variables 
 Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RDPI) 
Islamic banks  Dual banks 
 (1) RDPI (2) W-RDPI (3) G2SLS (4) GMM  (5) RDPI (6) W-RDPI (7) G2SLS (8) GMM 
Panel A: Independent variables  
Lagged RDPI     3.46***      4.31*** 
IGQ 7.35*** 5.73*** 8.40***  2.74**  6.33*** 5.79*** 5.23***  1.84* 
NGQ 2.91*** 1.21 3.83***  4.39***  3.23*** 2.95*** 2.79***  3.58*** 
NGQ* IGQ 2.04** 3.20*** 0.94  1.09  2.19** 1.15 0.41  0.91*** 
Panel B: Control variables. 
BDSZ 9.20*** 8.97*** 7.46***  1.31  10.30*** 9.75*** 10.26***  1.07*** 
GNDI 2.92*** 3.48*** 0.72 -1.55  -4.33*** -4.76*** -3.36*** -2.35** 
NEDs 4.25*** 3.96*** 3.31***  0.20  3.73*** 3.53*** 2.65***  0.01 
NGQ* BDSZ 3.10*** 2.33** 3.60***  2.35**  5.25*** 4.98*** 6.45***  2.19** 
NGQ*GNDI 2.09** 1.92* 2.45**  0.07  1.95* 1.67* 3.10***  1.93* 
NGQ* NEDs 2.47** 1.07 2.73***  0.72  0.41 0.39 1.63  2.86*** 
LTAS -0.57 -0.41 1.26  2.20**  8.01*** 8.34*** 7.87***  1.27 
ROA 0.58 0.33 -0.89 -1.23  5.55*** 5.65*** 4.67***  1.44 
LIQR 4.06*** 4.27*** 3.60*** -1.13  4.21*** 4.19*** 3.18***  2.93*** 
CSTR 0.68 0.89 0.38 -0.79  2.14** 2.31** 2.08** -1.45 
CAPR 1.26 1.10 1.30  0.97  -0.10 0.62 0.98 -0.06 
INFR -0.12 0.34 -1.26  0.82  -1.43 -0.29 -0.89 -1.36 
GDPC -3.32*** -3.56*** -1.89* -0.92  0.46 -0.05 0.56 -1.71* 
Constant -1.66 -2.12** -2.37** -2.11**  -9.91*** -11.21*** -8.29***  0.37 
Fixed effect Year Year Year  Year  Year Year Year  Year 
Clustering Bank Bank Bank  Bank  Bank Bank Bank  Bank 
F- value ( χ 2) 42.45*** 35.04*** 542.71*** 142.84***  38.90*** 35.87*** 712.86*** 121.73*** 
Overall R2 0.4207 0.3118 0.5734   0.6112 0.5708 0.5329  
No of obs 189 189 189 162  236 236 236 199 
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ 
Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. The final number of bank-year 
observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for Dual banks. This table reports the 
following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure practices 
(W-RDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (NEDs), Islamic governance (IGQ), national governance 
quality (NGQ), bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), capital adequacy (CAPR), annual 
inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). See Table 3 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10: National governance quality, Islamic governance quality, and risk management and disclosures 
practices: Strongly- vs. poorly-governed environments 
Variables 
 Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RDPI) 
Strongly governed environment  Poorly governed environment 
 (1) RDPI  (2) W-RDPI  (3) G2SLS (4) GMM (5) RDPI  (6) W-RDPI  (7) G2SLS (8) GMM 
Panel A: Independent variables 
Lagged RDPI     4.50***      8.05*** 
IGQ  2.74***  2.15**  3.97***  2.78***   7.64***  5.58***  8.66***  1.98* 
NGQ  7.16***  5.10***  8.47***  3.69***   1.50  1.27  0.34  0.70 
NGQ* IGQ  1.12  0.22  1.52  0.83  -2.50** -2.48** -2.24** -0.10 
Panel B: Control variables 
BDSZ 11.04***  9.37***  11.85***  1.92*   7.15***  6.78***  6.70***  0.35 
GNDI  0.42  0.23  0.32  1.28  -0.71 -0.40 -1.43 -3.22*** 
NEDs  5.82***  4.87***  5.70***  0.19  -0.39 -0.66  0.64  0.11 
NGQ* BDSZ  6.67***  5.56***  7.37***  1.93*   0.80  0.84  0.02  1.40 
NGQ*GNDI -0.78 -1.01  0.42  0.92   0.25  0.93  0.32  0.13 
NGQ* NEDs -1.19  0.21 -2.01**  0.87  -2.66*** -2.22** -1.84*  0.13 
LTAS  3.17***  3.22***  3.23*** -1.08   0.91  1.71*  2.69***  2.51** 
ROA  1.32  1.02  0.96 -1.29  -0.55 -1.16 -1.35  0.85 
LIQR  3.05***  3.24***  3.15*** -0.30   2.49**  2.14**  2.07** -0.24 
CSTR  2.09**  1.90*  1.68*  0.08  -0.21 -0.10  0.37 -1.15 
CAPR  0.62  1.30  0.74 -3.15***   1.10  0.65  0.53 -0.37 
INFR -1.82* -0.42 -1.83* -1.72*   0.72  0.68 -1.07  0.78 
GDPC -0.53 -1.50 -1.33 -1.71*   0.57  1.03  2.49**  1.55 
Constant -5.77*** -5.91*** -5.16***  2.00*  -1.68* -2.96*** -2.78***  0.24 
Fixed effect  Year  Year  Year  Year   Year  Year  Year  Year 
Clustering  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank   Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
F- value ( χ 2) 47.36***  37.69***  829.46*** 164.11***  34.91***  27.88***  542.27*** 12591.40*** 
Overall R2  0.6900  0.5952  0.7732    0.5858  0.5351  0.6767  
No of obs  199  199  199 161   226  226  226 176 
Notes: The sample consists of all listed Islamic and Dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ 
Websites, Banscope Database and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. The final number of bank-year 
observations are 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for Dual banks. This table reports the 
following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure practices 
(W-RDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (NEDs), Islamic governance (IGQ), national governance 
quality (NGQ), bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), capital adequacy (CAPR), annual 
inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). See Table 3 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
